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SYNOPSIS: This paper provides empirical evidence on the materiality thresholds adopted in 
“change in accounting estimate” (CAE) disclosures. We also investigate the characteristics of the 
disclosing firms and their auditors, as well as the characteristics of the CAEs, such as the effect on 
income, the accounts affected, and disclosure venue. U.S. GAAP requires firms to disclose a CAE 
if its effect on the financial statements is deemed to be “material” (ASC 250-50-4). We analyze 
4,335 CAE disclosures from 2006 to 2016 and provide the first descriptive evidence of the actual 
materiality thresholds used for CAE disclosures in practice. Our main finding is that quantitative 
materiality thresholds for CAE disclosures are significantly lower than conventional materiality 
thresholds, such as 5 percent of pretax income, and that firms may not only apply quantitative 
materiality thresholds more conservatively, but that other qualitative considerations play an 
important role in determining CAE materiality. Our results also show that there exists considerable 
variation in CAE disclosure across firm size, industry membership, auditor, financial statement 
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Materiality is an “overused and under-defined notion” in accounting as well as in law 
(Oesterle 2011). In fact, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) leaves the formal 
definition of materiality intentionally vague so that no bright-line rules can be used to limit the 
amount of important information released to investors. 1  Nonetheless, volumes of accounting 
literature have attempted to more precisely identify the quantitative, qualitative, and other 
contextual considerations conventionally used in the determination of materiality in various 
financial reporting and auditing settings. This mosaic approach is unavoidable and even desirable 
due to the inherent nature of the materiality concept and its pervasive use in financial reporting.  
In this paper, we investigate the application of the materiality concept in financial reporting 
by examining firm disclosures of a material change in accounting estimate (CAE, hereafter). U.S. 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) require that, in the period of the change, firms 
disclose CAEs that have a material effect on the financial statements. We utilize 4,335 individual 
CAEs disclosed by 2,050 unique firms during the years 2006 – 2016, and provide descriptive 
evidence on the characteristics of CAEs and the implicit materiality criteria adopted for CAE 
disclosure. Additionally, we examine how the characteristics of the reporting firms, their auditors, 
and the financial statement accounts associated with the CAEs are related to disclosure materiality 
thresholds. 
Our results reveal that a significant percentage of CAE disclosures fall below conventional 
quantitative materiality thresholds. Specifically, on average, about 60 percent of disclosed CAEs 
in our sample are smaller than traditional quantitative materiality thresholds. Our results with 
 
1 In SAB (Staff Accounting Bulletin) 99, the SEC defines a matter as material “if there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable person would consider it important” (SEC 1999). Similarly, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) dictates in Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 that any accounting information is material if 
its omission or misstatement “in the light of surrounding circumstances, makes it probable that the judgment of a 
reasonable person relying on the information would have been changed.” 
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respect to CAEs are markedly different than those for restatements as found by Acito, Burks, and 
Johnson (2009) who examine restatements of prior lease accounting errors. They find that the 
magnitude of lease restatements is distributed roughly as a bell-shaped curve, centered around the 
traditional materiality threshold of 5 percent of earnings.  Unlike restatements or error corrections, 
that are backward-looking modifications of previously reported financial statements, CAEs are the 
revisions of forward-looking estimates and forecasts resulting from the ongoing current and future 
reporting of business activity. Our findings imply that when firms and their auditors make these 
forward-looking materiality judgments for CAE disclosure, they may not only apply quantitative 
materiality thresholds more conservatively, but, consistent with SAB 99 (SEC 1999), they may 
also consider additional qualitative factors in these decisions. 
Additionally, we provide evidence that firms with CAE disclosures tend to be relatively 
large and highly concentrated in the manufacturing industry when compared to the general 
Compustat population. We also find that there is considerable variation for clients among Big 4 
auditors and between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in applying CAE materiality thresholds. Lastly, 
the CAE financial statement accounts analysis reveals that revenue, liabilities, depreciation, tax, 
and compensation-related CAEs are most frequently disclosed, and there is significant variation in 
applied materiality thresholds across the different financial statement accounts. 
Our finding that firms give significant qualitative consideration to disclosure decisions 
regarding CAEs provides compelling empirical evidence that when considering whether to 
disclose a CAE, firms generally appear to follow the SEC’s guidelines that require evaluations of 
materiality in terms of quantitative and qualitative dimensions. In sum, our findings also suggest 
that, collectively, firms disclose more CAEs than would be expected by applying traditional 
materiality thresholds. We believe that these additional disclosures provide added information 
from management regarding their approaches, methods and perspectives, resulting in improved 
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financial reporting transparency. However, we also find that the application of CAE materiality 
thresholds varies significantly across firms, industries, auditors, and financial statement accounts. 
Our results suggest that further empirical research is warranted regarding the necessity and 
expected benefits of additional CAE disclosure requirements.2 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. The next section reviews prior literature 
about CAEs and materiality and develops our primary research questions. We then discuss our 
sample selection process and research design, followed by an analysis of CAE data to provide 
answers to our proposed research questions. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
CAE Disclosure Requirements and Materiality Judgments 
Accrual-based accounting critically depends on the ongoing estimation of the future status 
of a firm’s assets, liabilities, and operations. Depreciation of long-lived assets, the collectability of 
receivables, the amount of future sales returns and allowances, salability of slow-moving inventory, 
the amount of future pension obligations, and the usability of uncertain tax positions are just a few 
examples of financial statement items that require a substantial amount of estimation. Reporting 
many financial statement accounts require the use of estimates, and estimates always involve 
making certain assumptions and projections about future activities and events. When new 
information emerges after the initial estimation, the original estimate needs to be updated and its 
change, if material, is required to be disclosed in financial statements (see the Appendix for several 
CAE disclosure examples). The need for the disclosure of a material CAE is an unavoidable result 
of the periodicity reporting principle and the ongoing assessment of a firm’s expected future 
 
2 For example, the U.K. and the Netherlands require auditors to disclose in their audit reports the materiality thresholds 
they adopt for auditing clients. However, the regulatory bodies in the U.S. such as the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) have not seriously considered a similar additional disclosure requirement. (Christensen, 
Eilifsen, Glover, and Messier 2018) 
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financial position and operational activities. In this sense, CAEs are forward-looking and reflect 
the uncertainty of estimating future events and business activities, both historically and currently.  
According to U.S. GAAP, as captured in Accounting Standard Codification 250 (ASC 250-
50-4), the disclosure of a CAE is required if its expected impact is deemed to be “material.” 
Specifically, if the effects of a CAE on current and future income, including per-share amounts, 
are judged to be material, then the CAE must be disclosed in the financial statements that reflect 
the change. However, disclosure is not required if CAEs arise in the ordinary course of operations, 
so long as the overall impact on the financial statements is immaterial (ASC 250-50-5).  
As with other financial statement disclosure issues, materiality thresholds play a critical 
role in determining whether a CAE must be separately disclosed. However, as the SEC has 
emphasized, the exclusive reliance on “any percentage or numerical threshold has no basis in the 
accounting literature or the law” (SEC 1999, p. 2). The SEC reinforced this notion by specifically 
indicating that “a materiality evaluation must be based on all relevant quantitative and qualitative 
factors” (SEC 2006, p. 2). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has also consistently ruled that no 
bright-line rules should be adopted for the determination of materiality. In fact, in the case of 
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the use of a 
“statistical significance” criterion for making disclosure decisions, because it could be construed 
as a bright-line rule for defining materiality.3 Further, as evidence of how deeply engrained the 
concept and the purposefully vague definition of “materiality” is in U.S. financial reporting, when 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) proposed a change in 2015 to try and align  the 
accounting definition of materiality more closely to the legal definition, it was met with fierce 
 
3 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., the manufacturer of Zicam Cold Remedy, received several reports related to the adverse 
effects of its drug. However, the firm chose not to disclose the reports on the basis that they failed to find “statistically 
significant” evidence of a connection between the observed side effects and its product. However, the Court posited 
that even though some information may not have exhibited statistical significance in a cause-effect relation, it may 
still be considered material if investors were to act in response to the information (Oesterle 2011). 
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resistance and quickly abandoned  (FASB 2015). Accordingly, judgments of materiality should be 
made on a case-by-case and fact-specific basis, in consideration of all relevant quantitative and 
qualitative information. 
In practice, the materiality judgements for CAEs, and all financial statement disclosures, 
depend on how the reporting firm and their auditors collaborate to reach agreement on the issue 
(Acito, Burks and Johnson 2019). As the auditors must attest to the firm’s financial statements 
(and filings with the SEC), final decisions regarding materiality and the need for separate financial 
statement disclosures are typically determined jointly between firm management, the Audit 
Committee of the Board of Directors, and the auditors. Concurrently, managers may be concerned 
that their accounting estimates can be perceived as excessively aggressive or possibly even 
fraudulent by the public (Roychowdhury 2006). Therefore, managers may be reluctant to make 
disclosures of one-time adjustments, such as CAEs in order to avoid additional public scrutiny and 
critical examination of not only the CAE, but all the prior reporting periods that may be associated 
with the change (Hamilton, Hirsch, Murthy, and Rasso 2018). In contrast, auditors may want 
managers to disclose a CAE to minimize their potential litigation risk arising from seemingly 
tolerating a client’s opportunistic financial reporting practices (Venkataraman, Weber, and 
Willenborg 2008). Thus, materiality decisions for CAE disclosure are typically negotiated between 
the firm and their auditor. 
Materiality Thresholds and Disclosure Distributions 
The most common rule of thumb for the determination of materiality among financial 
reporting professionals is what has been referred to as the “5 percent rule,” which advises that any 
amount greater than 5 percent of earnings should generally be considered material (SEC 1999; 
Keune and Johnstone 2009). While other quantitative rules of thumb exist, the 5 percent rule is 
often applied in practice, as documented by the literature (Eilifsen and Messier 2015; Acito et al. 
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2019).4 In fact, SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 (SAB 99) specifically addresses this quantitative 
rule and posits that a formulaic approach such as the 5 percent rule, by itself, is not sufficient for 
judging materiality as other qualitative factors that might engender quantitatively small amounts 
to be deemed material.5 SAB 99 (SEC 1999) states: 
“The staff has no objection to such a ‘rule of thumb’ as an initial step in assessing 
materiality. But quantifying, in percentage terms, the magnitude of a misstatement 
is only the beginning of an analysis of materiality; it cannot appropriately be used 
as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant considerations.” (p. 2) 
 
 Nonetheless, the SEC concedes that the “use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, 
such as 5%, may provide for a preliminary assumption” (SEC 1999, p. 2) that an amount of less 
than the specified percentage may likely be judged to be immaterial. For this reason, prior 
accounting literature has often focused on identifying the quantitative materiality thresholds used 
in practice across reporting firms, auditors, and individual financial statement accounts (Heitzman, 
Wasley, and Zimmerman 2010).  
For example, Acito et al. (2009) provides evidence about the materiality thresholds adopted 
for disclosing the correction of lease accounting errors in the period 2004-2005.6 Their results 
show that, except for the very large and clearly material amounts, the distribution of amounts 
reported in the restatements is roughly a bell-shaped curve around the traditional quantitative 
 
4 When evaluating the magnitude of errors and other accounting items for materiality, individuals typically assess the 
amounts relative to other current financial statement amounts. Examples of comparative measures commonly used by 
auditors (Eilifsen and Messier 2015) as well as researchers in the accounting literature include net income, pretax 
income, net sales, and total assets. For example, Gleason and Mills (2002) use 5 percent of pretax income and 0.5 
percent of total assets to investigate firms’ materiality judgments regarding contingent liability disclosures. Liu and 
Mittelstaedt (2002) use 0.5 percent of net sales, 5 percent of income from continuing operations, 0.5 percent of total 
assets, and 1 percent of equity as thresholds to test the materiality measures. Keune and Johnstone (2009) use 5 percent 
of net income, 1 percent of total assets, and 1 percent net sales as benchmark materiality thresholds. Legoria, 
Melendrez, and Reynolds (2013) simply use 5 percent of pretax income as a general guide on materiality. 
5 According to SAB 99, qualitative considerations in judging the materiality of misstatements include, but are not 
limited to, whether the misstatement affects earnings trends, market earnings consensus, operation or profitability, 
compliance with regulatory requirements, compliance with contractual requirements, management’s compensation, 
concealment of an unlawful transaction, or the registrant’s stock price.  
6 In their paper, they distinguish between firms with material errors in their lease accounting as evidenced by the 
choice to do a formal restatement in order to correct the previous errors. These are contrasted against firms who chose 
an informal catch-up adjustment approach to correct what are deemed to be immaterial errors. 
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threshold of 5 percent of earnings. We present their aggregate frequency distribution results in 
Figure 1. Their findings suggest that firms and their auditors appeared to generally be 
implementing the 5 percent rule when determining materiality thresholds for material error 
correction disclosures. However, their results also provide evidence that qualitative considerations 
were also important for judging materiality because approximately one-third of the errors corrected 
through restatement are smaller than the traditional 5 percent of income threshold.  
 <Insert Figure 1 here> 
In a more recent study, Acito et al. (2019) examine SEC comment letter conversations in 
order to determine what benchmarks managers used to support their materiality decisions. By 
examining 108 conversations between the SEC and firms on which the SEC questioned the firm’s 
materiality judgements, the authors find that management used numerous benchmarks to support 
their materiality decisions, but that earnings was the most common. They also find that for errors 
judged by the firm to be immaterial, the “5 percent of earnings” threshold was commonly exceeded, 
and often by a substantial amount. Surprisingly, they report that in approximately 50 percent of 
the comment letter conversations, management indicated that at least one period’s earnings were 
misstated by at least 23.7 percent by not correcting the error, implying that management considered 
errors of this magnitude to be immaterial. These findings are all the more interesting as they are 
drawn from SEC comment letter conversations from 2009 to 2015 after SAB 108 was released 
(SEC 2006), which was a period of heightened SEC focus on requiring firms to improve their 
materiality judgements. 
Keune and Johnstone (2009) examine the error corrections disclosed after the SEC released 
SAB 108 (SEC 2006). Essentially, SAB 108 requires firms to re-evaluate the cumulative effects 
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of yearly immaterial errors and report them in the current period if their accumulation is material.7  
Keune and Johnstone (2009) find that the median values of the newly defined “material error” 
correction disclosures were for amounts considerably below the 5 percent rule, as well as most 
other often used quantitative rules of thumb (Eilifsen and Messier 2015). Their results suggest that 
the reporting firms either adopted even more stringent reporting thresholds for determining 
material amounts after SAB 108, or that they included the examination of qualitative factors to 
determine the smaller amounts were material, given the other surrounding facts and circumstances. 
However, since Eilifsen and Messier (2015) report that the largest auditors use similar quantitative 
reporting thresholds to assess materiality in the period after SAB 108 as they appeared to have 
used prior to SAB 108, the results of Keune and Johnstone (2009) seem to have been reflective of 
the inclusion of qualitative factors in the firms’ determination of materiality.  
While Acito et al. (2009) and Keune and Johnstone (2009) have examined materiality 
thresholds for different samples of error corrections, we examine the characteristics of disclosed 
material CAEs. Unlike error corrections that must be reported immediately upon discovery, CAEs 
are changes determined by management and, accordingly, have some reporting flexibility not 
afforded error corrections. In addition, we note that while error corrections, including restatements, 
are backward-looking as they are a result of past financial reporting, CAEs are forward-looking as 
they are a result of the ongoing current and future reporting of business activity in the financial 
statements. Therefore, the time periods assessed by error corrections and CAEs are fundamentally 
different. Accordingly, we might expect differences with respect to materiality thresholds for 
reporting CAEs compared to error corrections.  
 
7 SAB 108 requires firms and auditors to more formally consider the accumulation of immaterial errors over multiple 
periods and the cumulative effects on current year-end Balance Sheet accounts– the “iron curtain” approach. Adopting 
the iron curtain approach would lead to more instances to be identified as material and in need of error correction. 
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Another possible difference between these two types of disclosures may be due to signaling 
behavior. For both CAEs and error corrections, the benefits of disclosure are similar in that the 
timely correction of prior period errors or inaccurate estimation can provide the protection from 
subsequent SEC scrutiny and present the appearance of transparency. However, there may be 
important asymmetries when it comes to the downside of disclosure. CAE disclosures and error 
restatements could be perceived by markets as a form of earnings manipulation and be interpreted 
as a negative signal. However, the associated strength of this negative signaling may be relatively 
low for CAEs, given that they carry an inherent expectation of imprecision that may require future 
revision. In contrast, error restatements may send relatively stronger negative signals, given that 
they are a backward-looking admittance of earlier misreporting and therefore may perhaps carry a 
possible connotation of ineptitude or malfeasance. Therefore, especially when judging the 
materiality of borderline cases, firms may be significantly more willing to disclose a CAE than an 
error restatement of similar magnitude, thus resulting in the two different-looking distributions. 
Finally, the income effect of a disclosure may have different implications in materiality 
decisions. All of the lease error adjustments examined in Acito et al. (2009), and 63 percent (219 
out of 350) of the SAB 108 error corrections examined in Keune and Johnstone (2009) were 
income-decreasing. However, CAEs can be either income-increasing or income-decreasing. Thus, 
materiality distributions may be reflective of the fact that firms are more likely to separately 
disclose income-increasing effects than income-decreasing effects for similar magnitudes of 
changes. This would lead firms to disclose relatively smaller amounts of income-increasing CAEs 
compared to income-decreasing error adjustments, leading to lower average overall quantitative 
assessments for CAEs compared to disclosures of accounting errors. 
Further, if firms, on average, disclose CAEs only when they meet or exceed traditional 
materiality thresholds, this would be evidence that in practice firms are strictly applying 
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quantitative materiality thresholds when evaluating the reporting requirements related to CAE 
disclosure. However, if firms often disclose CAEs at amounts significantly below traditional 
quantitative materiality thresholds, this would provide evidence that firms are likely incorporating 
additional qualitative factors into their CAE disclosure decisions, or that they are attempting to 
provide additional financial reporting transparency beyond the minimum required by GAAP. Both 
of these reasons would result in firms disclosing more CAEs at lesser amounts, thereby enhancing 
financial statement transparency through the additional information provided by managers 
regarding their approaches and reasoning behind more of the estimates underlying their financial 
statements.  
  Therefore, we extend the literature on materiality thresholds that is currently based 
primarily on error correction disclosures. Specifically, prior studies assessing accounting 
materiality determinations in practice have examined different types of accounting error correction 
or restatement disclosures. Ours is the first study to examine materiality determinations in on-
going accrual accounting estimates and forecasts, the changes of which result in CAE disclosures 
when deemed material. As such, we extend the literature and present a robust examination of 
materiality thresholds currently adopted in practice for CAE disclosures. Accordingly, our main 
research question (RQ1) is: 
RQ1: What are the characteristics of the frequency distribution of CAEs? 
CAE Firm Characteristics and Materiality Thresholds 
 Even though estimation is a fundamental and critical facet of accrual accounting, little is 
known about the common characteristics of firms that disclose CAEs (henceforth, “CAE firms”). 
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More importantly, what kind of materiality thresholds are used in practice for CAE disclosures by 
firms with differing characteristics remains unanswered.8    
We believe that a firm’s size and its industry membership are the two most important 
characteristics affecting CAE disclosures. The size of a firm is likely to be related to CAE 
disclosure decisions for three primary reasons. First, materiality is a firm-specific and relative 
concept, which makes the same amount of a CAE material for a small firm and immaterial for a 
large firm. For this reason, Georgiev (2017) suspects that the idea of relative materiality may allow 
large firms to circumvent the disclosure requirements for what might otherwise be material 
contracts, legal proceedings, and spending on business projects.9 Second, firm size is a common 
proxy for voluntary disclosure choice. Larger firms tend to provide detailed, voluntary information 
in order to reduce information asymmetry and to lower the costs of business operations and 
financing. Disclosure of a material CAE is mandatory under GAAP, but there may be incentives 
related to voluntary CAE disclosure, especially when no binding materiality thresholds exist 
(Heitzman et al. 2010). Third, larger firms are typically more complex and therefore more likely 
to depend on relatively sophisticated estimation methods, which may be subject to larger and more 
frequent revisions. At the same time, larger firms might have more resources and experience that 
enable them to develop more accurate estimation models, which may actually minimize the 
possibility of needing to report significant subsequent changes to their initial estimates.  
 
8 Some possible exceptions include: Eckles and Halek (2010) find that managers of insurance firms manipulate 
estimates of their loss reserves in order to maximize their compensation when they have capped bonuses and 
exercisable stock options. Comprix and Muller (2011) find that managers opportunistically select biased pension 
accounting assumptions in order to obtain labor concessions.  
9 For example, Items 601(b)(10) of Regulation S-K and Item 1.01 of Form 8-K Final Rule require a firm to disclose 
material definitive acquisition agreements with a brief description of the terms and conditions of the agreements. 
However, Microsoft did not follow these disclosure rules for the $8.5 billion Skype acquisition in 2011. This deal size 
was equivalent to 30 percent of net income ($28.1 billion) and 7.8 percent of assets ($108.7 billion) in that year. This 




Industry membership is another firm characteristic that might be associated with CAE 
disclosure choice for several reasons. First, each industry may share common characteristics in 
terms of operating cycle, operating complexity, and litigation risk. These industry-specific factors 
can influence firms’ CAE disclosure choices. For example, the length of an operating cycle may 
be associated with the frequency of needing to adjust an estimate. Also, business operation 
complexity from being in certain industries may increase accounting estimation errors. 
Furthermore, if firms belong to one of historically litigious industries, they may be more likely to 
provide more up-to-date detailed information about their operations in order to avoid potential 
litigation. Herding behavior among firms in the same industry might also drive CAE disclosure 
choice. When there are no bright-line rules, firms tend to benchmark against peers in the same 
industry when making their accounting and financial reporting decisions. For example, Kedia, Koh, 
and Rajgopal (2015) document that a firm’s earnings management technique using a specific 
account can be contagious to peers in the same industry. They further show that this within-
industry contagion takes place only when there are no serious negative consequences from 
restatement, such as SEC investigations or securities class action lawsuits. In sum, we expect that 
CAE disclosure choice may be associated with the size and industry membership of a CAE firm. 
Therefore, we state our second research question (RQ2) as follows: 
RQ2: What are the characteristics of CAE firms and the implicit materiality thresholds 
guiding their disclosure choices? 
Auditors and Materiality Thresholds 
 Auditors jointly decide, or at least confirm, the need to disclose a CAE with their audit 
clients (henceforth, “CAE clients”). In fact, in SAB 99 the SEC often indicates that the registrant 
and their auditor need to consider all the relevant information when making materiality 
assessments. Therefore, as it is with different firms, different auditors may use similar quantitative 
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and qualitative metrics but arrive at slightly different thresholds for determining materiality. 
Eilifsen and Messier (2015) study the materiality guidance of the eight largest auditors in the U.S. 
and find that they all utilize income before taxes, total assets, and total revenue as prominent 
measures for deriving quantitative materiality thresholds.10 However, the guidance for materiality 
thresholds for each measure vary across auditors. Specifically, the audit firms in the study propose 
that amounts over the range of 3 percent to 10 percent for income before income taxes, 0.25 to 2 
percent for total assets, and 0.5 to 5 percent for total revenue be considered material. However, 
there is little empirical evidence regarding the implementation of this guidance into the actual 
levels used in practice and the variation of materiality thresholds between auditors (Wright and 
Wright 1997; Keune and Johnstone 2009).  
Based on prior literature that suggests Big 4 auditors have higher audit quality than non-
Big 4 auditors (Francis 2004; Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchick and Velury 2013; DeFond 
and Zhang 2014), and that Big 4 auditors apply materiality thresholds differently in practice than 
non-Big 4 auditors (Keune and Johnstone 2009), we examine whether Big 4 membership is 
associated with differences in CAE disclosure. Big 4 auditors might have lower materiality 
thresholds in order to provide higher audit and financial reporting quality. At the same time, Big 
4 auditors have larger clients who pay substantially larger amounts of audit fees, which may cause 
them to be more accommodating to their clients’ preferences, possibly leading to higher materiality 
thresholds and fewer disclosed CAEs. 
Using restatement data related to lease accounting errors, Acito et al. (2009) conclude that 
there are minor variations among the Big 4 auditors, but that non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to 
consider their client’s accounting errors material and to require a restatement compared to the Big 
4 auditors. In their study of SAB 108 error corrections, Keune and Johnston (2009) find that, in 
 
10 One auditor utilized after-tax income instead of before-tax income.  
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general, non-Big 4 clients report more error corrections that are above the typical asset materiality 
thresholds than Big 4 clients. In addition, and in contrast to Acito et al. (2009), they find 
considerable variation among Big 4 auditors when assessing materiality thresholds based on 
income. Thus, these researchers find differences among the Big 4 auditors and between Big 4 and 
non-Big 4 auditors with respect to frequency and materiality thresholds for the reporting of error 
corrections. Beyond these two studies, however, very little is known about whether there exists a 
marked difference among the Big 4 auditors and between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in 
determining materiality thresholds in practice generally, as well as for reporting other required 
financial reporting items, such as CAE disclosures. In sum, since there are no definitive 
authoritative standards or bright line rules, auditors are likely to establish their own individual 
materiality thresholds. Therefore, we state our third research question (RQ3) as follows: 
RQ3: How do materiality thresholds for CAE disclosures vary across auditors? 
CAE Account Characteristics and Materiality Thresholds 
In SAB 99, the SEC posits that “the degree of precision that is attainable in estimating the 
judgment item” should also be considered in materiality decisions and that the amount of 
estimation error deemed immaterial “may increase as the attainable degree of precision decreases” 
(SEC 1999, footnote 14). For example, SAB 99 goes on to note that “accounts payable usually can 
be estimated more accurately than contingent liabilities arising from litigation, or threats thereof, 
and a deviation considered to be material in the first case may be quite trivial in the second” (SEC 
1999, footnote 14). This guidance implies that different thresholds of materiality may apply to 
CAE disclosures for different financial statement accounts.  Therefore, analyzing CAEs by what 
financial statement account is affected (i.e., their “category”) can provide additional insight into 
whether materiality thresholds vary across specific financial statement items.  
15 
 
In conjunction with examining CAEs by financial statement account, we also examine 
several characteristics of the disclosed CAEs. Specifically, we investigate industry concentration, 
disclosure venue, and income effect (i.e. income-increasing vs. income-decreasing) in terms of 
frequency and materiality thresholds. Industry characteristics may be associated with specific CAE 
categories. For example, one may expect CAEs related to financial derivatives to be more frequent 
in the finance and banking industries. Similarly, inventory-related CAEs may be expected more 
often in the wholesale and retail industries because these industries have greater fluctuation and 
uncertainty regarding valuing inventory. However, if the finance and banking industries, or the 
wholesale and retail industries, have developed advanced capabilities that enable them to make 
more accurate estimates of these critical business and financial statement components, they may 
report fewer CAEs associated with financial derivates or inventory, respectively, than firms in 
other industries without this account-specific expertise.  
The second CAE characteristic we examine is the disclosure venue. Since CAEs are 
disclosed in the reporting quarter they are determined, they could be initially disclosed in a 
quarterly 10-Q filing or an annual 10-K filing.11 We note that CAEs initially reported in 10-Q 
filings would also subsequently be reported in the CAE firm’s 10-K filing. However, firms might 
strategically initially use form 10-Q for disclosure instead of form 10-K to avoid heavier scrutiny 
by the firm’s auditor who must audit the annual financial statements included in 10-K filings but 
only review the quarterly financial statements included in 10-Q filings. Another possibility is that 
firms might choose to disclose CAEs in a 10-K over a 10-Q filing because the estimation change 
might take place in the last quarter of the operating period. Therefore, if firms do not strategically 
time CAE disclosures, and CAE determinations are made evenly throughout the year, we would 
expect to find roughly 75 percent of CAEs are initially disclosed in 10-Q filings and 25 percent in 
 
11Our analysis includes only the initial disclosure of the CAE for analysis, either in the 10-Q or 10-K, not both. 
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10-K filings, but the actual proportions and the magnitude of those disclosures is an empirical 
question.  
The third characteristic we explore is the effect of CAEs on income. SAB 99 postulates 
that even a quantitatively immaterial item can be deemed to be material if a firm considers 
meaningful qualitative factors, such as a CAEs capacity to turn a negative income positive, 
maintain an earnings trend, or beat analysts' forecasts. Accordingly, we examine whether 
materiality thresholds appear to be different between income-increasing and income-decreasing 
CAEs. We also examine whether specific accounts are used more frequently as a way to influence 
income trends or current-period income levels, and whether materiality thresholds for these CAEs 
are different from other CAEs.  
Collectively, our fourth research question (RQ4) is intended to investigate the relationship 
between CAE financial statement accounts and the characteristics of industry membership, 
disclosure venue, and direction of the income effect on materiality thresholds, stated as follows: 
RQ4: How do the characteristics of disclosed CAEs differ by financial statement account, 
disclosure venue and effect on income? 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
We use the Audit Analytics CAE database to acquire data for CAE disclosures from 2006 
to 2016. Our initial sample includes 6,020 CAEs disclosed through 10-K or 10-Q filings of U.S. 
firms. We eliminate 1,096 CAEs having no pretax income or net income effect information. We 
use Compustat to obtain firm financial information and remove another 589 CAEs disclosed by 
firms with missing data. Our final sample comprises 4,335 CAEs disclosed by 2,050 unique firms. 
We obtain auditor information from Audit Analytics and perform firm-level, auditor-level, and 
individual CAE-level analyses in order to investigate our research questions. 
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Following Keune and Johnstone (2009) and Eilifsen and Messier (2015), we study three 
common quantitative thresholds that the eight largest U.S. audit firms consider when making 
materiality judgments: pretax income, total assets, and net sales. For each measure, consistent with 
audit firm documentation reported in Eilifsen and Messier (2015), we adopt the most common 
thresholds espoused by the eight audit firms: 5 percent for pretax income, 0.5 percent for total 
assets, and 0.5 percent for net sales.12 For example, the quantitative income threshold indicates 
that if the amount of a CAE is greater than 5 percent of the current period’s pretax income, then 
that item is generally regarded as material and should be separately disclosed in the financial 
statements. Similarly, CAE amounts falling below the quantitative threshold are generally 
regarded as immaterial and do not require separate financial statement disclosure. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the CAE sample. In columns (2) 
and (3) of Panel A, the average CAE amount in absolute-value terms is $45.0 million and the 
median value is $2.2 million. There exists significant skew in the distribution of CAEs as 
evidenced by the large standard deviation (column 4), and the considerably larger mean value 
compared to the median value, indicating that CAE distribution is not normally distributed. 
Therefore, we focus on the median value instead of the mean value in our analyses. In column (3) 
of Panel A, the median value of income-increasing (income-decreasing) CAEs is $2.3 (-$2.1) 
million.13 Additionally, column (1) of Panel A provides evidence that the frequency of income-
increasing CAEs (2,471) is greater than that of income-decreasing CAEs (1,864). We note that our 
CAE results contrast those of Keune and Johnstone (2009) who find that 56.7 percent of error 
corrections following SAB 108 were income-decreasing. Additionally, Acito et al. (2009) find that 
all of the corrections of prior accounting for operating leases in their study were income-decreasing.  
 
12 We use the reported impact on pre-tax income as the CAE amount. If this information is not available in the Audit 
Analytics CAE database, we assume a 40 percent tax rate to convert net income into pre-tax income (Moehrle 2002). 




<Insert Table 1 here> 
Panel B in Table 1 reports firm-level, net CAE-effect statistics to examine whether firms, 
on average, use CAEs to increase income or to decrease income. Column (1) indicates that CAEs 
increased income at 1,155 firms and decreased income at 892 firms over our 11-year examination 
period. Columns (3) and (4) of Panel B reveal that firms with CAEs that decrease income have 
slightly larger net median effects (in terms of absolute value) with a much smaller standard 
deviation. Panel C reports the frequency of CAE disclosures per firm over our sample period. 
Approximately 60 percent of firms disclosed only one CAE, while only about 13.2 percent (4.5 + 
2.7 + 6.0) make more than three CAE disclosures during the sample period.14  
RESULTS 
RQ1: What are the characteristics of the frequency distribution of CAEs? 
Figure 2 presents the observed frequency distributions of CAE disclosures by the three 
quantitative materiality thresholds. Irrespective of the materiality threshold metric being used to 
evaluate the sizes of the CAEs, all three frequency distributions are similar in general shape and 
for not exhibiting bell-shaped curves centered on the materiality threshold, indicative of firms 
focusing exclusively on quantitative thresholds. In fact, in all three cases, the lowest-value 
intervals have the highest frequencies, except for the very largest-value intervals, which simply 
condense the long right tails of the skewed distributions for the sake of graph readability. These 
findings imply that 1) even a small-sized CAE is deemed material by many firms and auditors, and 
2) the qualitative factors in determining materiality play a very predominant role in the disclosure 
of CAEs below traditional quantitative materiality thresholds.  
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
 
14 As noted in the Additional Analysis section, if we restrict our sample to only the first CAE reported by a firm, our 
results and inferences remain substantively unchanged compared to the full sample results. 
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 Our results are considerably different than those of lease error restatements examined by 
Acito et al. (2009). One possibility for differences in distribution frequency is that the error 
restatement data examined in Acito et al. (2009) was from August 2004 to August 2006, a period 
prior to SAB 108, while our CAE data is from fiscal years 2006 to 2016, a period subsequent to 
SAB 108. SAB 108 became effective for fiscal years ending after November 15, 2006 and, as 
noted previously, required a more stringent approach to assessing materiality. Adopting a stricter 
approach to the determination of materiality would result in relatively smaller amounts to be 
considered material after SAB 108 compared to earlier. Consistent with this argument are the 
results of Keune and Johnstone’s (2009) examination of error corrections in response to SAB 108. 
These researchers also find that the median magnitudes of the error corrections were also 
considerably lower than traditional quantitative materiality thresholds.  
In addition, the income effect may differentially impact materiality decisions of CAEs 
compared to error corrections. The error corrections examined in Acito et al. (2009) and Keune 
and Johnstone (2009) are more likely to be income-decreasing, both in number and in average 
magnitude. However, CAEs can be either income-increasing or income-decreasing. Thus, the 
materiality distribution differences may be due to the fact that firms are more likely to separately 
disclose income-increasing effects of CAEs than income-decreasing effects of error corrections, 
leading to relatively lower average overall quantitative assessments for CAEs. Nonetheless, our 
findings suggest that CAEs, on average, are disclosed at fairly small magnitudes, and often well 
below traditional materiality thresholds. 
Another possible explanation of the differences in our CAE distribution results and those 
of error corrections reported in prior studies is that error corrections are backward-looking as they 
are a result of past financial reporting, while CAEs are forward-looking as they are a result of the 
ongoing current and future reporting of business activity in the financial statements. Therefore, the 
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time periods assessed by error corrections and CAEs are fundamentally different. Our findings 
imply that when firms make materiality judgments for CAE disclosure, they may not only apply 
quantitative materiality thresholds more conservatively, but, consistent with SAB 99 (SEC 1999), 
they may also weigh other qualitative factors differently for CAEs compared to error corrections. 
RQ2: What are the characteristics of CAE firms and the implicit materiality thresholds 
guiding their disclosure choices? 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of firms that disclosed CAEs and their industry 
membership. Panel A of Table 2 compares the sizes of the three accounting measures used as 
quantitative materiality thresholds between our sample of CAE firms and all firms covered by 
Compustat in the year 2010. Approximately 24 percent (i.e., 2,050 divided by 8,637) of firms in 
Compustat disclosed a CAE at least once during the sample period. CAE firms, on average, are 
more profitable than the population in Compustat in terms of median pretax income ($12.1 million 
vs. $4.3 million), but the difference is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.550). However, CAE 
firms are about two times larger than the Compustat population in terms of median total assets 
($682.8 million vs. $316.4 million; p-value < 0.001), and median net sales ($483.8 million vs. 
$197.2 million; p-value < 0.001). 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the concentration of CAE Firms in two-digit SIC industry 
classifications. In column (1) and (2) of Panel B, Manufacturing 2 (two-digit SIC, 30–39) and 
Hotels and Service (70–79) industries are over-represented in our sample compared to the 
Compustat 2010 population by 4.7 percentage points (= 23.4 - 18.7) and 3.3 percentage points (= 
14.6 - 11.3), respectively. However, the Agriculture and Construction (two-digit SIC, 00–19) and 
Finance (60–69) industries are significantly under represented compared to the general Compustat 
population by -9.7 percentage points (= 5.7 - 15.4) and -6.6 percentage points (= 13.4 - 20.0), 
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respectively. One possible explanation of the under-representation of the agricultural industry 
might be that this industry is stable by nature, and significant complex accounting estimation is 
not frequently required. In contrast, under-representation of the financial industry might be 
explained by the fact that this type of industry specializes in controlling and abating estimation 
errors. Pearson Chi-square test results (p-value < 0.001) reported in the last row of Panel B indicate 
that the CAE sample industry distribution is statistically significantly different from the firms in 
Compustat 2010, suggesting our CAE sample is not reflective of a randomly drawn sample of the 
firms in Compustat 2010.  
Panel C of Table 2 presents the percentage of CAEs below each materiality threshold by 
firm size. We partition CAE firms into five different size groups in terms of net sales and analyze 
the proportion of CAEs  below the common materiality thresholds.15 As noted previously, we use 
5 percent of pretax income, 0.5 percent of total assets, and 0.5 percent of net sales as our common 
quantitative thresholds in order to assess CAE disclosure decisions.  
The results provide several interesting findings. First, the predominant portion of disclosed 
CAEs are smaller than traditional quantitative thresholds.16 This can also be seen in Figure 2; the 
graph on the left (right) side represents the relative frequency distribution (cumulative relative 
frequency distribution) for CAEs scaled by pretax income, assets, and net sales. The first half of 
all CAEs are well below the traditional thresholds. Statistical sign tests easily reject the null 
hypotheses that the medians of the different CAE distributions are equal to the traditional 
thresholds, with p-values of less than 1 percent in all three cases.17 Second, all three materiality 
 
15 Alternatively using pretax income or total assets to categorize CAE firms into multiple different size groups 
produces similar results.  
16 Specifically, 58.7 percent, 68.1 percent, and 61.2 percent of CAEs are below 5 percent of pretax income, 0.5 percent 
of assets, and 0.5 percent of net sales, respectively. In contrast, Acito et al. (2009) find that about 30 percent of their 
restatement sample lies below a 5 percent of earnings threshold. However, Keune and Johnston (2009) find that 58.9 
percent, 94.0 percent, and 87.9 percent of error corrections following SAB 108 were below their thresholds of 5 
percent of pretax income, 1 percent of assets, and 1 percent of net sales, respectively.  
17 The median values of CAEs normalized by pretax income, assets, and net sales are 3.4 percent, 0.24 percent, and 
0.31 percent, respectively. The statistical results are not tabulated, but available upon request. 
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thresholds generate similar results, meaning that, at least for the judgement of CAE materiality, 
these three thresholds can generally be used interchangeably. Third, consistent with Eilifsen and 
Messier (2015) the percentage of CAEs exceeding the quantitative threshold tends to decrease as 
the size of firm increases. For example, the percentage of CAEs exceeding the 0.5 percent of net 
sales threshold decreases from a high of 81.3 percent to a low of 24.0 percent,18 implying that the 
larger a firm is the more likely it is to consider qualitative factors and other voluntary disclosure 
motivations.19 
Panel D of Table 2 analyzes the frequency of CAEs by CAE Firm industry membership. 
In column (1), Manufacturing industries (Manufacturing 1 and 2 combined) account for 41.9 
percent (= 14.7 + 27.2) of disclosed CAEs, while Hotels and Services industries (14.5 percent) and 
Transportation and Utilities industries (11.9 percent) also disclose frequently. In column (2), we 
find that Agriculture and Construction industries have comparatively high percentages of CAEs 
exceeding the quantitative materiality thresholds (48.4, 40.6, and 39.0 percent), while Wholesale 
and Retail industries have low percentages (29.6, 18.9, and 12.2 percent). 
To test whether litigation risk might affect a firm’s CAE disclosure choice, we partition 
the CAE sample into two groups with high and low litigation risk. Following Francis, Philbrick, 
and Schipper (1994), industries having SIC codes of 2833–2836 and 8731–8734 (Biotechnology), 
3570–3577 and 7370–7374 (Computers), 3600–3674 (Electronics), and 5200–5961 (Retailing) are 
coded as high litigation risk, and all other industries are considered low litigation risk. Untabulated 
results provide evidence that litigation risk has no conclusive association with CAE disclosure. 
Specifically, the percentage of CAEs below 5 percent of pretax income, 0.5 percent of net sales, 
 
18 At first glance, it may seem that this is almost true by definition, i.e. the ratio of CAE to assets decreases as assets 
increase.  However, it should be noted that larger firms also have the propensity to disclose larger CAEs; in fact, the 
Spearman correlation coefficient between log(assets) and log(|CAE|) is 0.651 (p-value < 0.001). 
19 Point-biserial correlation coefficients are calculated to test the relation between firm size and the percentage of 
CAEs exceeding thresholds. For the pretax income, total assets, and sales thresholds, respectively, we find coefficients 
of -0.092, -0.096, and -0.109, all with corresponding p-values = <0.001. 
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and 0.5 percent of assets is higher by 3.2 percentage points, lower by 3.7 percentage points, and 
lower by 2.8 percentage points, respectively, for the high litigation risk group compared to the low 
litigation risk group. 
Our RQ2 analysis results can be summarized as follows: (1) On average, CAE firms are 
larger than representative Compustat firms. (2) CAE firms are more highly concentrated in 
Manufacturing (20–29 and 30–39) and Hotels and Service (70–79) industries, and less 
concentrated in Agriculture and Construction (00–19) and Finance (60–69) industries. (3) 
Approximately two-thirds of CAEs have effects that are smaller than traditional materiality 
thresholds. (4) The importance of quantitative materiality thresholds tends to decrease as the size 
of a firm increases. (5) Litigation risk has no significant association with CAE disclosure. 
RQ3: How do materiality thresholds for CAE disclosures vary across auditors? 
Table 3 presents the CAE auditor analysis. 20  Panel A shows the proportion of CAE-
disclosing firms audited by each of the Big 4 auditing firms, as well as non-Big 4 auditing firms 
as a group. It also presents the auditors’ market share of all firms in Compustat for 2010. In column 
(5), 22.4 percent of CAE firms are audited by non-Big 4 auditors while the overall market share 
of non-Big 4 auditors in Compustat 2010 is 38.4 percent, revealing that non-Big 4 auditors, on 
average, are less likely to be associated with CAE-disclosing firms. In contrast, all Big 4 auditors 
have higher percentages of clients disclosing CAEs compared to their overall market share of firms 
in Compustat. Among the Big 4 firms, firm Big 4a in column (1) has the highest percentage of 
clients disclosing CAEs (26.0 percent) during our examination period, as well as the largest 
difference of CAE clients compared to their overall market share, i.e. a difference of 9.2 percentage 
points (= 26.0 - 16.8). 
 
20 The total listed under “CAE” in column (6) of 2,154 is greater than the number of CAE firms in the sample, because 
104 CAE firms changed auditors over the sample period, and we include both auditors for the sake of this analysis 




<Insert Table 3 here> 
Panel B in Table 3 presents the industry distribution of CAE clients by auditor. As would 
be expected, the aggregate results in the last column of Panel B are very similar to the CAE 
company results by industry reported in Panel B of Table 2. However, the Pearson Chi-square test 
results reported in the last row of Table 3 indicate that not only is the aggregate CAE client sample 
not a random representation of the Compustat 2010 population, neither are the industry 
distributions of CAE clients reflective of the client portfolios of any of the Big 4 auditors or 
collectively for the non-Big 4 auditors. An examination of the CAE clients versus overall client 
portfolios for each of the auditors reveals a fairly consistent pattern across the individual auditors 
and in the aggregate that suggests firms in the Manufacturing (20–39) and Hotel (70–79) industries 
are over-represented and that the Agriculture (00–19) and Finance (60–69) industries are under-
represented compared to Compustat and to each auditor’s overall client portfolio. 
Table 4 analyzes CAE disclosure frequency, income-increasing CAE proportions, and 
materiality thresholds by auditor. Panel A compares the frequency of CAE disclosure of each of 
the Big 4 auditors and collectively for the non-Big 4 auditors. First, we find that the Big 4a firm 
had the highest frequency of CAE clients (560) compared to the other Big 4 auditors and non-Big 
4 auditors (ranging from 336 to 482). To explore this further, we partition CAE clients into two 
groups – “infrequent CAE clients,” who disclosed fewer CAEs than the average, and “frequent 
CAE clients,” who disclosed more CAEs than the average. 21  In column (5) of Panel A, the 
concentration of infrequent CAE clients is higher in the non-Big 4 auditors (86.7 percent) 
compared to all of the four Big 4 auditors (ranging from 78.0 to 79.1 percent). These results suggest 
 
21 The mean number of CAE disclosures per firm-auditor pair for our examination period is 2.01. Accordingly, 
“frequent CAE clients” were those with three or more CAEs. 
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that, on average, clients of Big 4 auditors are more likely to frequently disclose CAEs than clients 
of non-Big 4 auditors.22 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Panel B reports the proportion of income-increasing CAEs by auditor. More precisely, we 
sum all CAEs released by a firm-auditor pair and calculate the percent of net positive cases out of 
the total number of firm-auditor pairs in that category.  In the last column, overall, 56.2 percent of 
CAE clients are associated with income-increasing CAEs. Specifically, 56.9 percent of CAE 
clients with infrequent CAE disclosures have income-increasing CAEs, while 53.3 percent of the 
CAE clients with frequent CAE disclosures have income-increasing CAEs. While we find income-
increasing CAEs occur at rates slightly greater than 50 percent, our overall results suggest that 
both frequent and infrequent CAE clients do not appear to be substantively reporting only income-
increasing CAEs. This finding also holds for the individual auditors. 
The results presented in Panel C of Table 4 reflect the materiality thresholds adopted for 
CAE disclosure by auditor, and provides several interesting insights about CAE materiality 
thresholds. First, from columns (1), (2), and (3), a large percentage of CAE disclosures are below 
the conventional quantitative materiality thresholds: 58.7 percent for pretax income, 68.1 percent 
for assets, and 61.2 percent for net sales. For example, in column (1), about 58.7 percent of CAE 
disclosures are below 5 percent of the pretax income threshold (“<5%”) while 16.4 percent of 
CAEs are above four times the pretax income threshold (“>20%”). This finding implies that 
qualitative considerations play an important role in determining CAE disclosure materiality for 
CAEs with small magnitudes. Second, clients of non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to have a lower 
concentration of CAEs below the conventional materiality thresholds than clients of Big 4 auditors. 
 
22 A test of independence between non-Big 4 firms and the sum of all Big 4 firm observations yields a Pearson Chi-
square statistic of 16.1 with a corresponding p-value of less than 0.001. 
26 
 
In column (1), 43.6 percent of CAEs audited by non-Big 4 auditors are below 5 percent of pretax 
income, while 58.9 percent to 63.6 percent of CAEs audited by Big 4 auditors are below that 
threshold. We find a similar pattern for non-Big 4 and Big 4 auditors using the assets and net sales 
materiality thresholds in columns (2) and (3), respectively.  
Panel D of Table 4 analyzes the existence of discontinuity around the conventional 
materiality thresholds and tests whether the auditors’ materiality judgments are sensitive to the 
materiality thresholds. If firms and their auditors are sensitive to conventional materiality 
thresholds, we would expect to observe discontinuity in the number of CAEs right around the 
threshold with significantly fewer occurrences just before the threshold and then significantly more 
occurrences after the threshold is met. The last row in Panel D shows that the number of CAEs 
steadily decreases as the materiality threshold interval increases from 4 percent to 6 percent, 
indicating that traditional thresholds have no additional effect on materiality judgments.  
Results of our RQ3 analysis can be summarized as follows: (1) Big 4 auditors are more 
likely to be associated with CAE clients, compared to non-Big 4 auditors. (2) The Big 4a firm has 
the highest CAE client frequency compared to the other Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 auditors. (3) 
Non-Big 4 auditors have higher infrequent CAE client concentration than Big 4 auditors. (4) The 
frequency of a client’s CAE disclosures is generally not substantively associated with income-
increasing CAEs for all auditors. (5) A substantial quantity of CAE disclosures are well below all 
quantitative materiality thresholds, indicating that qualitative considerations play an important role 
in judging the materiality of CAEs. (6) Non-Big 4 auditors are less likely to have clients reporting 
CAEs that are below traditional quantitative materiality thresholds. (7) Auditors and their clients 
are not sensitive to the precise cutoffs of the conventional quantitative materiality thresholds. 
RQ4: How do the characteristics of disclosed CAEs differ by financial statement account, 
disclosure venue and effect on income? 
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Table 5 analyzes the industry concentrations of the 14 CAE financial statement account 
categories included in the Audit Analytics CAE database. In the last column of Table 5, we find 
that CAE disclosures related to revenue (22.3 percent), liabilities (21.2 percent) and depreciation 
(14.7 percent) are the most common financial statement accounts effected by CAEs; while asset 
retirement (1.1 percent), PPE (properties, plant, and equipment) & intangibles (0.7 percent), and 
derivatives (0.4 percent) are the least common financial statement accounts affected by CAEs. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
However, we find that each industry has a different concentration of CAE account 
categories. In column (1), the highest concentration of CAEs for the Agriculture and Construction 
(00–19) industries is related to asset retirements, representing 20.4 percent of all asset retirement 
CAEs. In columns (2) and (3), the Manufacturing industries (20–29 and 30-39 combined) represent 
41.9 percent (= 14.8 + 27.1) of total CAEs, and have the highest concentrations of inventory (71.4 
percent = 27.7 + 43.7), revenue (50.5 percent = 14.0 + 36.5), and pension (50.6 percent = 22.9 + 
27.7) related CAEs. Interestingly, the Manufacturing industries have more than 25 percent 
concentrations in all CAE categories except for PPE & intangibles (23.6 percent), cash & 
receivables (16.9 percent) and derivatives (16.7 percent). In column (4), Transportation and 
Utilities (40–49) have the highest concentration of asset retirement (40.7 percent) and depreciation 
(27.9 percent) related CAEs. In column (6), the Finance industry (60–69) has the highest 
concentration of cash & receivables (50.3 percent) and derivatives (50.0 percent) related CAEs. 
Wholesale and Retail (50–59), Hotel and Services (70–79), and Health, Legal and Education (80–
99) have no outstanding (i.e., over 20 percent) concentrations in any of the CAE account categories. 
Table 6 presents a breakdown of the overall results presented in Panel A of Table 1 by the 
accounts effected by CAEs, and presents the results of several CAE account analyses. Panel A 
shows the CAE size and disclosure venue analysis by income-effect direction (income-increasing 
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vs. income-decreasing) and CAE account. The absolute-value CAE results in column (1) present 
the account breakdown of the median value of $2.2 million for all CAEs and indicate that the 
significant standard deviation is mainly driven by tax-related CAEs. The proportion of CAEs 
initially disclosed through 10-K filings (“10-K prop.”), on average, is 32.5 percent, which is higher 
than the 25 percent we would expect if CAEs were randomly distributed over the fiscal year.23 
Column (1) also indicates that inventory (55.5 percent) and pension related (49.4 percent) CAEs 
have the highest proportion of 10-K disclosure, and revenue (21.7 percent) has the lowest 
proportion of 10-K disclosure, followed by derivatives (22.2 percent) and compensation (25.4 
percent). 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
The comparison between income-increasing CAEs (column 2) and income-decreasing 
CAEs (column 3) shows that income-increasing CAEs are more frequent and have a larger mean 
(in terms of absolute value) and standard deviation, while their 10-K disclosure venue proportion 
is lower than that of income-decreasing CAEs by 6.6 percentage points (= 36.2 - 29.6). Individual 
CAE account comparisons reveal that income-increasing CAEs related to pension, asset retirement, 
and expenses are 24.3 (= 66.7 - 42.4), 18.6 (= 51.9 - 33.3), and 16.9 (= 45.5 - 28.6) percentage 
points relatively less likely to be initially disclosed through a 10-K filing, respectively. By 
comparison, income-decreasing CAEs related to acquisitions, “other estimates,” and taxation are 
18.0 (= 45.6 - 27.6), 6.7 (= 39.8 - 33.1), and 2.5 (= 36.2 – 33.7) percentage points less likely to be 
disclosed through a 10-K filing, respectively. 
Panel B of Table 6 compares the pretax income reporting thresholds (i.e., CAE amount 
divided by pretax income) for the CAE account categories separately for income-increasing and 
 
23 If CAEs are uniformly randomly distributed over the fiscal year, we would expect 75 percent to be first reported in 
a 10-Q over the first three quarters of the year and 25 percent to be reported in a 10-K filing for the fourth quarter. 
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income-decreasing CAEs. Overall, the median value of income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
CAEs is approximately 3.1 (4.0) percent of pretax income, which is smaller than the commonly 
used materiality threshold of 5 percent of pretax income. These overall results suggest that firms 
employ a lower materiality threshold for disclosing CAEs than the traditional materiality threshold 
based on pretax income. They also suggest that firms are generally more willing to disclose 
income-increasing CAEs at lower magnitudes than income-decreasing CAEs.  
Further, Pearson Chi-square test results reported in the last row of Panel B indicate that the 
distribution of CAEs across account categories is significantly different between income-
increasing and income-decreasing CAEs (p-value < 0.001). In column (1), among income-
increasing CAEs, the liabilities, depreciation, compensation, acquisitions, pension, and expense 
CAEs have smaller median values than the 3.1 percent median value of total income-increasing 
CAEs. In column (2), among income-decreasing CAEs, the liabilities, depreciation, compensation, 
acquisitions, and expense CAEs have smaller median values than the 4.0 percent median value of 
total income-decreasing CAEs. Untabulated analyses using total assets and net sales as thresholds 
produce similar results. 
To provide further examination of the pretax income reporting threshold, Panel C of Table 
6 reports the relative frequency of CAEs that fall into four intervals surrounding the common 5 
percent threshold by income-effect and CAE category. We divide materiality thresholds into four 
intervals – one interval below the traditional materiality threshold (i.e. below 5 percent of pretax 
income) and three intervals above the threshold (i.e. 5 percent – 10 percent, 10 percent – 20 percent, 
and above 20 percent of pretax income).24 Regardless of the income-effect direction, the overall 
relative frequency of CAEs below the 5 percent thresholds is quite substantial, and 60.7 percent of 
 
24 For simplicity, only the percentage of pretax income results are tabulated. Alternatively, using assets or net sales 
produces similar results. 
30 
 
income-increasing CAEs and 55.3 percent of income-decreasing CAEs are located in the lowest 
interval. In column (1), among the income-increasing CAEs, compensation (74.3 percent), 
expenses (71.4 percent), and pension (71.2 percent) related CAEs have a very high percentage of 
CAEs smaller than the traditional thresholds, indicating the general use of conservative materiality 
thresholds for these accounts. In column (2), among the income-decreasing CAEs, compensation 
(80.7 percent), liabilities (62.0 percent), and acquisitions (60.2 percent) related accounts also tend 
to have a high share of CAEs disclosed at lower than the traditional materiality thresholds. In t-
test comparisons of the incidence of CAEs below the 5 percent of pretax income threshold between 
the two income-effect groups, a significant difference (p < 0.01) exists in the application of 
materiality between CAEs related to liabilities (8.9 percentage points = 70.9 - 62.0), cash and 
receivables (31.0 percentage points = 59.6 - 28.6), and pension (37.9 percentage points = 71.2 - 
33.3). 
Our RQ4 analysis results can be summarized as follows: (1) revenue, liabilities, and 
depreciation are the most common accounts effected by CAEs, followed by the tax, compensation, 
and other estimates categories. (2) The manufacturing industries represent 41.9 percent of the CAE 
sample and are highly concentrated in the inventory, revenue, and pension CAEs. (3) Income-
increasing CAEs are more frequent than income-decreasing CAEs. (4) Overall, 32.5 percent of 
CAEs are initially disclosed through 10-K filings, and 29.6 percent (36.2 percent) of income-
increasing (income-decreasing) CAEs are disclosed through 10-K filings. (5) The median size of 
income-increasing (income-decreasing) CAEs relative to pretax income is approximately 3.1 
percent (4.0 percent), which is less than the traditional 5 percent materiality threshold. (6) For 
income-increasing (income-decreasing) CAE disclosures, CAEs effecting compensation, expenses, 
and pension (compensation, liabilities, and acquisitions) accounts tend to be disclosed most 
conservatively. (7) A substantial difference exists for liabilities, receivables, and pension account 
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categories between income-increasing CAEs and income-decreasing CAEs in conservatively 
applying materiality thresholds.  
Additional Analyses  
CAEs Below Multiple Materiality Thresholds 
 In our analysis, we have assumed that if a CAE was below a traditional quantitative 
materiality threshold, other qualitative factors were assessed in arriving at the materiality decision. 
However, it could be that the CAE was disclosed because it exceeded a different quantitative 
threshold than the one evaluated. Therefore, to determine if our results and conclusions are 
influenced by CAEs that fall below one materiality threshold and exceed other thresholds, we 
examine our sample of CAEs concurrently across all three quantitative thresholds. Results are 
presented in Table 7 and reveal that 2,026 CAEs (46.7 percent of our sample) do not exceed any 
of the three quantitative thresholds, and 984 CAEs (22.7 percent of our sample) exceed all three 
quantitative thresholds. Additionally, we find that of the CAEs falling below the pretax income 
threshold, 79.6 percent fall below all three thresholds. Likewise, 68.6 (77.1) percent of CAEs 
falling below the assets (net sales) threshold fall below all three thresholds. Therefore, our findings 
do not appear to be overly influenced by CAEs that fall below only one materiality threshold.  
<Insert Table 7 here> 
Alternative CAE Sample 
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by a small number of firms that disclose 
multiple CAEs, we recalculate all of our main analyses using an alternative data set that includes 
only the first CAE disclosed by each firm in our sample period (2006-2016). Untabulated results 
indicate that our primary findings are not significantly influenced by this alternative specification, 
and all of our inferences remain unchanged. 
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Analysis of CAEs below Traditional Materiality Thresholds – Qualitative Factors 
 Unlike prior research in this area (Acito et al. 2009, 2019), our sample does not include 
“non-material” CAEs. That is, we do not have data on changes in accounting estimates that were 
implemented but not formally disclosed. Accordingly, we are unable to directly examine factors 
that cause a firm to consider a change in estimate to be material, and therefore disclosed as a CAE. 
However, using our sample of disclosed CAEs we can explore how some qualitative factors may 
interact to influence disclosure below traditional materiality thresholds. Accordingly, we estimate 
the following multivariate logistic regression model:  
logit(Pr[BMT=1]) = β0 + β1 Prior_Restatement + β2 Critical +β3 Size + β4 Income_Effect + 
β5 10-K + β6 Big4 + β7 Repeat + β8 Litigation_Risk + β9 Leverage + 
β10 MTB + β11 Z-score + ε                                    (1)                                       
where BMT has a value of 1 if a CAE is below the materiality thresholds of 5 percent of pretax 
income, 0.5 percent of assets, or 0.5 percent of net sales, and 0 if above.25 
Our first variable of interest, Prior_Restatement, takes a value of 1 if a CAE firm had a 
restatement during the previous four quarters, and 0 otherwise.26 Our conjecture is that firms that 
have recent restatements may be more willing to disclose minor estimate changes in the interest of 
transparency during a time they feel subject to increased scrutiny as a result of the restatement. 
Our second variable of interest, Critical, takes a value of 1 if the CAE caused net income to move 
either above or below zero, and 0 otherwise. SAB 99 suggests that a possible qualitative factor to 
consider is whether inclusion of the amount in question changes income from a loss to a profit, or 
vice versa. Our interest here is in ascertaining if small-magnitude CAEs were disclosed because 
they were critical in determining whether a firm’s quarterly income switched from a loss to a profit, 
 
25 We winsorize the continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We also include indicator variables for CAE 
account category, one-digit SIC industry, and filing year. 
26 We obtain restatement data from Audit Analytics’ Restatements database. 
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or vice versa.27  
As additional covariates, we include the natural log of sales (Size) and indicator variables 
for whether a CAE is income-increasing (Income_Effect), whether a CAE is initially disclosed in 
a 10-K as opposed to a 10-Q (10-K), whether the auditor is a member of the Big 4 (Big4), and 
whether the firm is in a high-litigation-risk industry (Litigation_Risk). We also include leverage 
(Leverage), market to book ratio (MTB), and Altman’s z-score (Z-score) to control for additional 
considerations companies may factor into their materiality decisions (Acito et al. 2009).  
Regression results are presented in Table 8 and indicate that Prior_Restatement is positive 
and significant for the total assets and net sales regressions.  These results suggest that firms are 
more likely to disclose quantitatively smaller CAEs right after a restatement. More precisely, we 
estimate that a CAE disclosed after a recent restatement is more likely to be below the total assets 
(net sales) threshold with average marginal effects28 of 4.3 (3.9) percentage points. Further, we 
find that Critical is negative and significant in all three regressions. At first glance, this seems to 
suggest that the importance of the qualitative factor relating to the sign of a firm’s net income plays 
less of a role below conventional materiality thresholds, which is contradictory to our expectation.  
However, a closer look at the data reveals a more complete explanation: “critical” CAEs in our 
sample have mean (median) absolute values that are 16.3 (4.0) times greater than “non-critical” 
CAEs.  In other words, compared to below threshold CAEs, above threshold CAEs are simply 
larger and are more likely to be “critical” as they are also more likely to cause a firm to switch 
between positive and negative net income. Therefore, the sign and significance of this coefficient 
 
27 We obtain similar results if we separately examine CAEs pushing net income above zero and below zero. 
28 As logistic regression models are nonlinear, the actual marginal effects will vary across different values of the 
independent variables. In order to present a simple summary of the practical significance of our estimated coefficients, 
we report the “average marginal effects” (or “average predicted probabilities”), which are constructed from the 




is not surprising given that our model assesses the likelihood of CAEs being disclosed below the 
respective quantitative thresholds.29 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
With respect to the other variables in our model, both Size and Income_Effect have a 
positive and significant association with the likelihood of a disclosed CAE below all three 
quantitative thresholds.  Our Size results are consistent with those of Eilifsen and Messier (2015) 
who find auditors use decreasing percentages of thresholds as company size increases. Income-
increasing CAEs are more likely to be associated with below-threshold disclosures than income-
decreasing CAEs. We find this result interesting, as it suggests an asymmetrical application of 
materiality. We find 10-K to be negative and significant in all three models, suggesting that CAEs 
reported in 10-K filings are significantly larger than CAEs reported in 10-Q filings. This is likely 
because the preparation of a 10-K filing, in contrast to a 10-Q filing, involves a more thorough 
evaluation of the full fiscal year’s accounting which may be more likely to incorporate substantial 
changes to estimates for the current and future periods. Our results are also consistent with Acito 
et al. (2019) who find the SEC is more interested in materiality disclosures contained in 10-K 
filings compared to 10-Q filings.  We find significant positive effects due to auditor type (Big4) in 
our pretax income and total assets regression results, indicating Big 4 auditors are more likely to 
be associated with CAEs that lie below those thresholds. We also find evidence that CAEs 
disclosed by companies with high growth opportunities (MTB) are more likely to lie above the 
traditional thresholds for pretax income and total assets, and CAEs disclosed by financially 
distressed companies (Z-score) tend to be below the traditional threshold for net sales, although 
these effects are fairly small. Lastly, a firm’s debt load (Leverage) is significantly negatively 
 
29 This analysis also reveals that it is difficult to interpret the results of examining qualitative factors if they are closely 
correlated with the sizes of the CAEs themselves. However, this insight also serves to strengthen our inferences about 
the importance of other qualitative factors, such as prior restatements, since they are unlikely to be correlated with the 
size of subsequent CAEs. 
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associated with the thresholds of pretax income and total assets, suggesting that as debt load 
increases the likelihood of a firm disclosing a CAE below these thresholds decreases. 
In sum, our analysis of qualitative factors finds that, in general, recent restatements, large 
firm sizes, positive income effects, disclosures in 10-Q filings, and Big 4 auditors are significantly 
associated with the likelihood of disclosed CAEs falling below the traditional materiality 
thresholds. These findings provide further support that CAE materiality decisions are influenced 
not only by quantitative factors but by several qualitative factors as well. 
CAEs and Subsequent Restatements 
As an additional examination of qualitative factors influencing CAE materiality decisions, 
and in order to determine if CAE disclosure may be driven by auditor concerns that the firm may 
have a future restatement, and therefore require disclosure of a CAE, we examine the association 
of CAEs and subsequent restatements. To explore this possible relation, we conduct two panel 
regressions. In the first untabulated regression, we develop a model similar to Beaulieu, Hayes and 
Timoshenko (2017) to test for a relationship between CAEs and restatements of the same CAE 
fiscal quarter. Consistent with their results, we find strong evidence that quarters reporting a CAE 
are positively associated with subsequent restatements.30  In the second regression, we use a model 
of lagged CAE disclosures to test for a general association between CAE disclosures and 
subsequent restatements (regardless of the period being restated) for up to two years.  In this 
context, we also find evidence of a significant positive relation (untabulated), but only for the first 
quarter subsequent to the CAE.  Thus, in both analyses we find evidence that CAEs may signal 
the need for subsequent restatements and therefore justify the additional financial reporting 
transparency by requiring CAE disclosure.  
SUMMARY and CONCLUSION 
 
30 Detailed results available from authors upon request. 
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In this paper we provide descriptive evidence of materiality thresholds adopted for CAE 
disclosures (ASC 250-50-4). Specifically, we analyze the characteristics of CAE disclosures in 
terms of disclosing firms, their auditors, and CAE account categories in consideration of 
materiality thresholds, industry membership, disclosure venue, and income-effect direction. The 
primary contribution of our study is to provide the first descriptive evidence on material CAEs 
disclosed in the financial statements. Our examination extends the sparse literature on the 
application of materiality judgements in practice (Acito et al. 2009; Keune and Johnstone 2009; 
Eilifsen and Messier 2015), and to our knowledge, presents the first examination of CAE 
disclosures under U.S. GAAP. 
Our key finding is that both quantitative and qualitative considerations appear to be driving 
CAE disclosures and that the distribution of CAE materiality thresholds below conventional 
thresholds is quite different from that found in earlier investigations of restatements. Second, we 
compare CAE-disclosing firms with all firms in the Compustat population and find that CAE firms 
are larger and more concentrated in the manufacturing industry. We also find that more than 60 
percent of disclosed CAEs are lower than the traditional materiality thresholds of 5 percent of 
pretax income, 0.5 percent of assets, and 0.5 percent of net sales. Additionally, we find that firm 
size is negatively correlated with the percentage of CAE disclosures exceeding the traditional 
materiality thresholds. This finding indicates that larger firms make up a substantial amount of 
CAE disclosures that are below traditional thresholds, implying that larger firms are more 
conservative in disclosing CAEs. 
Third, our investigation into auditors and their CAE clients reveals that there exists some 
difference between auditors in applying quantitative materiality criteria. Specifically, compared to 
non-Big 4 auditors, Big 4 auditors are more likely to be associated with CAE clients, and to have 
a higher proportion of frequent CAE disclosing clients. We also find that, compared to non-Big 4 
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auditors, Big 4 auditors are more likely to have clients reporting CAEs that are below traditional 
quantitative materiality thresholds, suggesting that the weight given to quantitative materiality 
criteria is not the same between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. 
Fourth, we provide descriptive evidence on the characteristics and materiality thresholds 
of the accounts affected by CAEs. We find that manufacturing industries disclose CAEs most often 
and CAEs are highly concentrated in the inventory, revenue, and acquisition-related accounts. In 
addition, we find that, on average, the percentage of CAEs lower than the pretax income threshold 
is greater for income-increasing CAEs than for income-decreasing CAEs. Specifically, more than 
70 percent of income-increasing CAEs related to liabilities, compensation, and expense categories 
are disclosed at lower than 5 percent of pretax income.  This finding implies that auditors and firms 
are selectively more conservative in disclosing CAEs for certain accounts, especially if they are 
income-increasing CAEs. 
Our additional analyses examining below-threshold qualitative factors finds that recent 
prior restatements, firm size, positive income effects, Big 4 auditors, and financial stress are 
significantly positively associated with the probability of disclosing a CAE below a traditional 
materiality threshold. In contrast, firms with greater growth opportunities, disclosure via a 10-K, 
and firms with high leverage are significantly less likely to disclose a CAE below traditional 
materiality thresholds. We also find that in general CAE firms are more likely to restate their 
financial statements in subsequent periods. 
 We provide the first empirical evidence on the materiality thresholds adopted by firms for 
CAE disclosure. As such, our results should be of interest to firms’ Boards of Directors and their 
Audit Committees, auditors, investors and regulators. Our finding that CAEs are often reported at 
amounts below the traditional thresholds for quantitative materiality should be of interest to the 
SEC and other regulators as our results suggest that firms are attempting to adhere to SAB 99 and 
38 
 
SAB 108 guidance that requires both quantitative and qualitative considerations when determining 
materiality. Our results indicate that, in general, firms and their auditors consistently evaluate 
qualitative factors, and not just quantitative factors, in determining the materiality of amounts 
associated with CAEs. Further, as GAAP reflects minimum standards, our results suggest that in 
practice, firms are going beyond the minimum standards and providing information regarding 
CAEs often at amounts that are much smaller than traditional materiality thresholds would suggest. 
Disclosing additional CAEs enhances individual firm financial transparency, as well as the 
collective transparency for the US financial reporting system. Our results should also be of interest 
to investors as such conservative reporting postures by individual firms produces additional 
financial statement disclosures that present additional information regarding management’s 
approach, forecasts and reasoning behind the CAE that helps reduce information asymmetry 
between investors and reporting firms. Our finding of varying industry concentrations of CAEs, 
and CAEs for specific accounts, can be used by regulators, investors and analysts as additional 
information in order to evaluate the quality of financial reporting across firms as well as industries. 
Our finding of differences in materiality thresholds among the Big 4 auditors should be of interest 
to auditors, firms, regulators and investors. Auditors can use this information to benchmark 
themselves against other auditors, and regulators can potentially use this information to allocate 
resources to the oversight and review of auditor performance in this area of financial statement 
disclosure. Investors and financial statement users can use this information as part of their 
evaluation of firm performance and the adequacy of financial statement disclosure under GAAP.      
In addition, our findings have several implications for future accounting research and 
policy. First, our results are restricted to the reporting requirements of GAAP and the U.S. 
institutional environment. In future studies, it would be informative to perform similar 
examinations of CAEs in other countries reporting under IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
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Standards) to see how our results compare and contrast with those of firms under a different 
reporting framework, as well as from different national institutional regimes.31 It would also be 
informative for future research to examine the association between using higher/lower materiality 
thresholds and consequences to the firm such as future profitability or share price performance. 
An additional line of research that would extend our findings would be to explore the relation 
between CAE disclosures and other voluntary disclosure motivations such as signaling higher 
financial reporting quality using other proxies (e.g., timely loss recognition, reduced discretionary 
accruals). Lastly, the SEC, FASB and other standard-setters may consider reviewing materiality 
criteria for individual accounts and providing additional guidelines about the consistent application 
of materiality thresholds across financial statement elements.   
 
31 For example, IAS (International Accounting Standards) 8 in IFRS posits that “the effect of a change in an accounting 
estimate is recognized prospectively,” but unlike U.S. GAAP, there is no specific requirement with respect to the 
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CAE Examples from Top Five Most Frequent CAE Categories 
 
Case 1: Revenue - Boeing, 10-Q (2014.9.30) 
“Contract accounting is used for development and production activities predominantly by Defense, 
Space & Security (BDS). Contract accounting involves a judgmental process of estimating total 
sales and costs for each contract resulting in the development of estimated cost of sales 
percentages. Changes in estimated revenues, cost of sales, and the related effect on operating 
income are recognized using a cumulative catch-up adjustment which recognizes in the current 
period the cumulative effect of the changes on current and prior periods based on a contract’s 
percent complete. In the second quarter of 2014, higher estimated costs to complete the KC-46A 
Tanker contract for the U.S. Air Force resulted in a reach-forward loss of $425 of which the 
Commercial Airplanes segment recorded $238 and the BMA segment recorded $187. For the nine 
months ended September 30, 2014, net unfavorable cumulative catch-up adjustments, including 
reach-forward losses, across all contracts decreased Earnings from operations by $54 and diluted 
earnings per share by $0.06. For the three months ended September 30, 2014, net favorable 
cumulative catch-up adjustments, including reach-forward losses, across all contracts increased 
Earnings from operations by $91 and diluted earnings per share by $0.08. For the nine and three 
months ended September 30, 2013, net favorable cumulative catch-up adjustments, including 
reach-forward losses, across all contracts increased Earnings from operations by $184 and $20 and 
diluted earnings per share by $0.17 and $0.02.” 
 
Case 2: Liabilities - Sprint, 10-Q (2009.6.30) 
“In the second quarter 2009, we reduced the estimate of total severance and lease exit costs 
associated with our workforce reduction announced in January 2009 by $29 million. For the six-
month period ended June 30, 2009, total severance and lease exit costs associated with the January 
announcement were $298 million. Of these amounts, a benefit of $27 million and costs of $227 
million were related to the Wireless segment, and a benefit of $2 million and costs of $71 million 
were related to the Wireline segment for the same periods ended June 30, 2009, respectively.” 
 
Case 3: Depreciation - Verizon, 10-K (2014.12.31) 
“In connection with our ongoing review of the estimated remaining average useful lives of plant, 
property and equipment at our wireline and wireless operations, we determined that changes were 
necessary to the remaining estimated useful lives of certain assets as a result of technology 
upgrades, enhancements, and planned retirements. These changes resulted in an increase in 
depreciation expense of $0.6 billion in 2014. While the timing and extent of current deployment 
plans are subject to ongoing analysis and modification, we believe the current estimates of useful 
lives are reasonable.” 
 
Case 4: Tax - Verisign, 10-Q (2014.6.30)  
“During the three months ended June 30, 2014, the Firm completed the previously disclosed 
repatriation of $740.9 million of cash held by foreign subsidiaries, net of $28.1 million of foreign 
withholding taxes which were accrued during 2013. The Firm utilized substantially all of the 
remaining deferred tax asset for net operating loss carryforwards generated from the 2013 
worthless stock deduction to offset the income tax resulting from current year income and the 
repatriation. The repatriation generated foreign source income in the U.S. which allows the Firm 
to claim eligible foreign taxes amounting to $191.8 million paid in the current year and prior years 
as foreign tax credits instead of as deductions. The benefit from these foreign tax credits was 
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included in the computation of the deferred tax liability on unremitted foreign earnings as of 
December 31, 2013. The majority of these foreign tax credits will expire in 2024. The Firm 
believes it is more likely than not that it will realize the benefit from these foreign tax credits before 
they expire, and accordingly has recognized a deferred tax asset as of June 30, 2014. During the 
three months ended June 30, 2014, the Firm recognized a discrete tax benefit of $5.2 million in 
connection with the completion of the repatriation.” 
 
Case 5: Compensation - Amazon, 10-Q (2006.3.31)  
“The estimation of stock awards that will ultimately vest requires judgment, and to the extent 
actual results or updated estimates differ from our current estimates, such amounts will be recorded 
as a cumulative adjustment in the period estimates are revised. We consider many factors when 
estimating expected forfeitures, including types of awards, employee class, and historical 
experience. Actual results, and future changes in estimates, may differ substantially from our 
current estimates. In Q1 2006 we recorded a $13 million benefit, $8 million net of tax, or $0.02 
per diluted share, representing the cumulative effect of increasing our estimated rate of stock award 
forfeitures. As a result, the net amount of stock-based compensation classified as General and 






Materiality Frequency Distributions from Acito et al. (2009) 
 
Figure 1 presents the frequency distribution of the relative size of lease accounting errors corrected through 




Frequency Distributions of CAE Disclosures 
Panel A: Frequency Distribution of CAEs as Percentage of Pretax Income   
 
Panel B: Frequency Distribution of CAEs as Percentage of Assets 
 




Figure 2 presents the relative frequency distributions of CAE disclosures. The graph on the left (right) side represents 
the relative frequency distribution (cumulative relative frequency distribution) for CAE scaled by pretax income, 

















Absolute-Value CAEs  4,335   45.0   2.2   1,289.9  
Income-Increasing CAEs  2,471   60.6   2.3   1,705.1  
Income-Decreasing CAEs  1,864  - 24.4  - 2.1   124.2  
 












Absolute-Value CAEs  2,050   95.2   3.1   2,034.6  
Net Income-Increasing CAEs  1,155   117.9   2.4   2,546.1  
Net Income-Decreasing CAEs  892  -35.5  -2.9  185.2  
 
Panel C: Frequency of CAEs per CAE Firms 





1 1,223 59.7 
2 387 18.9 
3 170 8.3 
4 93 4.5 
5 55 2.7 
6 or more 122 6.0 
Total 2,050 100 
 
 
Panel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the CAE sample over the period 2006-2016. Panel B reports 





CAE Firm Analysis 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of CAE Firms versus Compustat 2010 Firms 

















Pretax Incomea 2,048 220.4 12.1 8,583 320.5 4.3 0.194 0.550 
Assets 2,050 9,474.6 682.8 8,637 11,834.8 316.4 0.248 < 0.001 
Net Sales 2,017 3,579.9 483.8 7,707 3,419.7 197.2 0.646 < 0.001 
 








N % n % 
Agriculture and Construction 00-19 116 5.7 1,331 15.4 
Manufacturing 1 d 20-29 346 16.9 1,198 13.9 
Manufacturing 2 e 30-39 479 23.4 1,619 18.7 
Transportation and Utilities 40-49 251 12.2 839 9.7 
Wholesale and Retail 50-59 147 7.2 561 6.5 
Finance 60-69 274 13.4 1,731 20.0 
Hotels and Services 70-79 300 14.6 975 11.3 
Health, Legal and Education 80-99 137 6.7 383 4.4 
Total 2,050 100 8,637 100 




Panel C: Materiality Thresholds by Firm Size 
Firm Size 
(Partitioned by Net Sales) 












% of Assets % of Net Sales 
$0 to $50 million 486 51.2 37.4 18.7 4.7 0.9 2.4 
$50 to $100 269 38.3 42.0 29.0 8.2 0.7 1.1 
$100 to $250 469 49.7 61.4 51.6 5.1 0.3 0.5 
$250 to $1,000 1,108 57.9 73.7 65.3 3.4 0.2 0.3 
> $1 billion 1,966 66.0 78.8 76.0 2.5 0.2 0.2 
Total 4,298 58.7 68.6 61.2 3.4 0.2 0.3 
 



























Agriculture and Construction 00-19  283  6.5 51.6 59.4 61.0 4.7 0.4 0.4 
Manufacturing 1  20-29  639  14.7 65.9 61.8 53.6 2.4 0.3 0.4 
Manufacturing 2  30-39 1,179  27.2 55.6 64.8 62.1 4.0 0.3 0.3 
Transportation and Utilities 40-49  515  11.9 62.5 77.3 65.8 2.9 0.2 0.3 
Wholesale and Retail 50-59  270  6.2 70.4 81.1 87.8 2.1 0.2 0.1 
Finance 60-69  499  11.5 54.4 76.2 46.0 4.1 0.1 0.7 
Hotels and Services 70-79  629  14.5 58.2 69.2 62.7 3.7 0.2 0.3 
Health, Legal and Education 80-99  321  7.4 53.9 60.7 63.3 4.3 0.3 0.3 
Total 4,335  100 58.7 68.1 61.2 3.4 0.2 0.3 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of CAE firms and their industry membership. Panel A compares the size of three accounting measures that are used as 
quantitative materiality thresholds between CAE firms and all Compustat firms in the year 2010. Panel B reports the concentration of CAE firms in two-digit SIC 
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industry categories. Panel C presents the percentage of CAEs exceeding each materiality threshold by firm size. Panel D analyzes the frequency of CAEs by CAE 
firms’ industry membership. 
a Pretax income (Compustat “pi”), Assets (Compustat “at”), and Net Sales (Compustat “sale”) for CAE firms are beginning balances (in $millions) of each account 
in the year CAEs are disclosed.   
b If a firm discloses several CAEs over the sample period, only the financial data corresponding to the CAE disclosed in the year closest to 2010 are used. 
c p-value for mean (median) value comparison is derived from a two-sample t-test (Mann Whitney Wilcoxon test).  
d Examples of Manufacturing 1 (two digit SIC code) industries include Food (20), Apparel (23), Printing (27), Chemicals (28), Petroleum refining (29). 




CAE Auditor Analysis 














CAE All c CAE All CAE All CAE All CAE All CAE All 
n 560 1,447 358 1,236 336 1,213 418 1,429 482 3,312 2,154 8,637 
% b 26.0 16.8 16.6 14.3 15.6 14.0 19.4 16.6 22.4 38.4 100 100 
 















CAE Industry CAE Industry CAE Industry CAE Industry CAE Industry CAE Industry 
00-19 5.4 9.4 5.0 12.2 5.7 17.1 4.6 16.4 7.3 18.2 5.7 15.4 
20-29 20.5 17.2 12.0 10.5 15.8 13.6 19.6 16.0 13.9 12.9 16.7 13.9 
30-39 22.1 20.7 24.0 17.9 18.8 15.4 23.4 19.5 27.8 19.1 23.4 18.7 
40-49 12.0 10.6 16.2 17.6 12.8 9.4 14.1 13.3 7.9 5.0 12.3 9.7 
50-59 8.2 8.3 8.1 8.7 8.9 7.7 6.7 5.2 4.8 5.0 7.2 6.5 
60-69 10.0 17.0 12.9 17.6 16.7 22.3 11.5 17.4 16.2 22.6 13.2 20.0 
70-79 14.6 12.7 15.4 12.1 15.8 10.7 13.2 8.9 15.2 11.6 14.8 11.3 
80-99 7.1 6.8 6.4 3.4 5.7 3.8 6.9 3.5 7.1 5.6 6.8 4.4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Pearson Chi-
square, df, p-value 
33.5, 7, <0.001 32.2, 7, <0.001 41.6, 7, <0.001 61.6, 7, <0.001 66.7, 7, <0.001 244.0, 7, <0.001 
 
Table 3 presents the CAE auditor analysis. Panel A shows the proportion of CAE-disclosing firms audited by each of the Big 4 auditing firms, as well as non-Big 4 
auditing firms as a group, as compared to the whole of Compustat 2010. Panel B reports the CAE coverage analysis by industry and auditing firm. 
a  Auditors are categorized into Big 4 and non-Big 4. Big 4a through Big 4d represent Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, respectively.  
b Percentages for “CAE” (“All”) represent the percentage of CAE-disclosing firms (all firms in Compustat 2010) audited by each auditor over the total number of CAE firms (total 
number of firms in Compustat 2010 sample). Note that the total in the CAE column (2,154) is greater than the number of CAE firms in Table 2 Panel A (2,050) because 104 CAE 
firms switch auditors over the sample period. 
c  Full sample of auditor data is based upon Compustat 2010 records.  
d  00-19 (Agriculture and Construction), 20-29 (Manufacturing 1), 30-39 (Manufacturing 2), 40-49 (Transportation and Utilities), 50-59 (Wholesale and Retail), 60-69 (Finance), 70-




CAE Disclosure Frequency, Income Effect, and Materiality Thresholds by Auditor 














n % N % n % n % n % n % 
Infrequent CAE Clientsa 443 79.1 281 78.5 262 78.0 326 78.0 418 86.7 1,730 80.3 
Frequent CAE Clients 117 20.9 77 21.5 74 22.0 92 22.0 64 13.3 424 19.7 
Total 560 100 358 100 336 100 418 100 482 100 2,154 100 
 
































Infrequent CAE Clients 258 58.2 152 54.1 151 57.6 190 58.3 234 56.0 985 56.9 
Frequent CAE Clients 66 56.4 40 51.9 39 52.7 54 58.7 27 42.2 226 53.3 





Panel C: CAE Materiality Thresholds by Auditor 
Audit 
Firms 
Percent of Pretax Income Threshold 
(1) 
Percent of Assets Threshold 
(2) 
Percent of Net Sales Threshold 
(3) 
n 
Percentage of CAE 
n 
Percentage of CAE 
n 




10% ~  
20% 
> 20% < 0.5% 
0.5%~ 
1% 
1% ~  
2% 
> 2% < 0.5% 
0.5%~ 
1% 
1% ~  
2% 
> 2% 
Big 4a  1,179  63.2 12.0 10.4 14.4 1,180  71.6 11.9 9.0 7.5 1,174  62.3 14.3 9.2 14.2 
Big 4b     749  58.9 15.8 11.0 14.4    749  69.7 15.8 8.1 6.4     747  65.2 16.5 9.1 9.2 
Big 4c     701  63.6 13.6 10.7 12.1     701  75.0 12.0 8.1 4.9     698  68.9 13.0 9.2 8.9 
Big 4d     898  62.5 15.6 9.7 12.2     899  76.6 12.6 6.5 4.3     890  69.7 13.5 9.0 7.9 
Non-Big 4     805  43.6 14.8 12.0 29.6     806  46.2 14.9 15.8 23.2     789  39.3 14.5 15.6 30.7 
Total   4,332  58.7 14.2 10.7 16.4 4,335  68.1 13.3 9.4 9.2 4,298  61.2 14.3 10.3 14.2 
 
Panel D: Discontinuities around Conventional Materiality Thresholds 
Audit 
Firms 
Incidence of CAEs around 
5% Pretax Income Threshold 
(1) 
Incidence of CAEs around 
0.5% Assets Threshold 
(2) 
Incidence of CAEs around 


























Big 4a 22 30 16 17 35 31 27 16 22 22 27 31 
Big 4b 23 20 14 14 30 24 16 21 28 23 18 16 
Big 4c 22 15 17 11 20 12 17 10 19 20 14 8 
Big 4d 19 19 25 19 22 21 21 12 23 20 21 18 
Non-Big 4 21 21 15 16 16 18 18 12 13 18 18 15 
Total 107 105 87 77 123 106 99 71 105 103 98 88 
 
Table 4 presents CAE disclosure frequency, income-increasing CAE proportions, and materiality thresholds by audit firm. Panel D examines whether there exist 
discontinuities around conventional materiality thresholds. 
a Infrequent (Frequent) CAE clients report fewer (greater) than the mean number of CAEs by firm-auditor pair (2.01) over our sample period. 
b II_CAE proportion represents the percentage of firms disclosing net income-increasing CAEs out of total CAE-disclosing clients per auditor (i.e. the counts in 




CAE Frequency by Accounts and Industry 
CAE Account 



















n Prop.b n Prop. N Prop. n Prop. n Prop. n Prop. n Prop. n Prop. nc %d 
Revenue 137 12.9 149 14.0 388 36.5 73 6.9 56 5.3 65 6.1 109 10.2 87 8.2 1,064 22.3 
Liabilities 28 2.8 119 11.8 312 30.9 72 7.1 67 6.6 125 12.4 196 19.4 92 9.1 1,011 21.2 
Depreciation 45 6.4 100 14.2 117 16.6 196 27.9 36 5.1 53 7.5 118 16.8 38 5.4 703 14.7 
Tax  15 4.3 43 12.4 87 25.1 38 11.0 29 8.4 51 14.7 64 18.4 20 5.8 347 7.3 
Compensation 10 3.1 58 18.2 82 25.7 13 4.1 37 1.6 44 13.8 54 16.9 21 6.6 319 6.7 
Other estimates 29 5.4 99 18.6 124 23.3 81 15.2 20 3.8 64 12.0 74 13.9 42 7.9 533 11.2 
Cash & Receivables 5 2.6 11 5.6 22 11.3 14 7.2 4 2.1 98 50.3 17 8.7 24 12.3 195 4.1 
Acquisitions 3 1.3 36 15.4 65 27.8 18 7.7 13 5.6 34 14.5 48 20.5 17 7.3 234 4.9 
Inventory 4 3.4 33 27.7 52 43.7 4 3.4 14 11.8 2 1.7 1 0.8 9 7.6 119 2.5 
Pension 7 8.4 19 22.9 23 27.7 18 21.7 8 9.6 4 4.8 4 4.8 0 0.0 81 1.7 
Asset retirement 11 20.4 13 24.1 5 9.3 22 40.7 2 3.7 1 1.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 54 1.1 
Expenses  2 3.5 16 28.1 12 21.1 7 12.3 2 3.5 7 12.3 5 8.8 6 10.5 57 1.2 
PPE & Intangibles 0 0.0 6 17.7 2 5.9 6 17.7 4 11.8 4 11.8 10 29.4 2 5.9 34 0.7 
Derivatives 2 11.1 2 11.1 1 5.6 3 16.7 0 0.0 9 50.0 1 5.6 0 0.0 18 0.4 
Total 298 6.3 704 14.8 1,292 27.1 565 11.8 292 6.1 561 11.8 701 14.7 358 7.5 4,771 100 
 
Table 5 presents the industry concentrations of 14 different CAE account categories available in the Audit Analytics database. 
a 00-19 (Agriculture and Construction), 20-29 (Manufacturing 1), 30-39 (Manufacturing 2), 40-49 (Transportation and Utilities), 50-59 (Wholesale and Retail), 60-
69 (Finance), 70-79 (Hotels and Services), 80-99 (Health, Legal, and Education) 
b Prop. is the concentration of each industry in each CAE account and calculated by dividing the number CAEs in each industry by the total number of CAEs in 
each account category. 
c The total of 4,771 is greater than the sample of 4,335 CAEs because 9.9% of all changes are associated with more than one account. 





CAE Account Analysis 






































Revenue  1,064  34.2 4.7  107.6  21.7  691  41.6 6.2  122.2  19.5 373  -20.3 -2.7  71.2  25.7 
Liabilities 1,011 23.1 2.0 121.5 36.2 546 8.1 1.7 24.2 33.0 465 -40.6 -2.5 175.7 40.0 
Depreciation 703 9.2 1.7 38.1 33.1 313 11.4 1.6 44.6 24.9 390 -7.4 -1.7 31.9 39.7 
Tax  347 287.9 4.2 4,539.8 35.5 246 400.2 4.5 5,390.8 36.2  101  -14.2 -3.5  43.5  33.7 
Compensation 319 2.9 0.8  7.1  25.4 210 2.5 0.8  5.9  21.0  109  -3.7 -0.9  8.9  33.9 
Other estimates 533 21.4 2.1 140.3 36.2 249 8.9 1.7 28.2 39.8 284 -32.3 -2.5 189.9 33.1 
Cash & Receivables 195 86.8 2.8 368.3 36.9 104 96.5 1.7 400.0 36.5 91 -75.8 -6.0 330.2 37.4 
Acquisitions 234 7.4 1.0 30.0 38.0 136 4.4 0.9 9.7 45.6 98 -11.5 -1.4 44.7 27.6 
Inventory 119 10.5 1.4 44.2 55.5 44 3.1 1.8 3.9 45.5 75 -14.8 -1.3 55.3 61.3 
Pension 83 48.9 5.1 116.7 49.4 59 31.7 4.0 88.1 42.4  24  -91.3 -6.5  162.4  66.7 
Asset retirement 54 16.3 4.6 27.7 42.6 27 17.3 4.5 30.4 33.3 27 -15.3 -5.0 25.3 51.9 
Expenses  57 4.5 1.5 6.4 35.1 35 4.8 1.4 7.6 28.6 22 -4.0 -2.2 4.2 45.5 
PPE & Intangibles 34 6.0 1.4 12.9 26.5 16 6.8 1.0 15.8 25.0 18 -5.2 -1.8 10.0 27.8 
Derivatives 18 86.3 17.9 156.4 22.2  9  45.6 5.8 77.6 22.2 9 -127.1 -32.0  205.5  22.2 





Panel B: Pretax Income Percentage by CAE Account and Income Effect 
CAE Account 
Income-Increasing CAEs  
(1) 
Income-Decreasing CAEs  
(2) 
n Mean % Median % S.D. % n Mean % Median % S.D. % 
Revenue  691  50.9 4.5 428.2  373  39.5 5.5 231.1 
Liabilities 546 25.3 2.1 301.8 463 41.4 3.1 274.7 
Depreciation 313 20.2 2.1 183.4 390 19.1 3.4 77.1 
Tax  246 69.2 7.9 229.6  101  27.7 5.4 71.7 
Compensation 210 11.4 2.0 49.9  109  8.7 1.0 43.3 
Other estimates 249 56.7 3.7 453.5 283 107.4 4.3 1,122.5 
Cash & Receivables 104 11.0 3.8 22.3 91 48.4 12.8 145.1 
Acquisitions 136 16.4 2.9 64.6 98 18.8 2.6 50.9 
Inventory 44 15.4 3.9 34.9 75 86.2 9.4 358.4 
Pension 59 18.5 1.0 51.9 24 164.0 6.1 713.0 
Asset retirement 27 13.7 3.3 41.9 27 25.7 4.2 55.6 
Expenses  35 7.4 2.2 12.7 20 30.7 3.8 80.3 
PPE & Intangibles 16 7.2 3.9 10.5 18 40.9 4.5 139.2 
Derivatives 9 104.7 6.2 288.4 9 14.2 4.6 17.5 
Total 2,685 35.6 3.1 307.5 2,081 45.3 4.0 459.5 
Pearson Chi-square, df, 












Percentage of CAEs in Pretax Income 
Intervals n 
Percentage of CAEs in Pretax Income  
Intervals 
< 5% 5%~10% 10%~20% > 20% < 5% 5% to 10% 10%~20% > 20% 
Revenue  691  53.4 19.3 14.0 13.3  373  48.0 14.2 15.0 22.8 
Liabilities 546 70.9 9.5 8.2 11.4 463 62.0 12.3 7.8 17.9 
Depreciation 313 66.8 15.0 10.5 7.7 390 60.0 14.1 10.5 15.4 
Tax  246 40.7 15.5 13.0 30.9 101 47.5 13.9 7.9 30.7 
Compensation 210 74.3 11.4 5.7 8.6 109 80.7 9.2 3.7 6.4 
Other estimates 249 55.8 13.3 13.3 17.7 283 53.7 14.1 9.9 22.3 
Cash & Receivables 104 59.6 16.4 10.6 13.5 91 28.6 15.4 19.8 36.3 
Acquisitions 136 63.2 12.5 10.3 14.0 98 60.2 14.3 7.1 18.4 
Inventory 44 56.8 13.6 13.6 15.9 75 38.7 14.7 14.7 32.0 
Pension 59 71.2 8.5 8.5 11.9 24 33.3 29.2 20.8 16.7 
Asset retirement 27 66.7 18.5 3.7 11.1 27 55.6 7.4 14.8 22.2 
Expenses  35 71.4 14.3 2.9 11.4 20 55.0 30.0 5.0 10.0 
PPE & Intangibles 16 56.3 31.3 6.3 6.3 18 55.6 11.1 22.2 11.1 
Derivatives  9  33.3 22.2 22.2 22.2  9  55.6 11.1 0.0 33.3 
Total 2,685 60.7 15.5 10.9 13.9 2,081 55.3 13.7 10.7 20.2 
 
Table 6 presents the results of CAE account analyses. Panel A reports the CAE size and disclosure venue analysis by income effect and CAE account. Panel B 
compares income-increasing CAEs with income-decreasing CAEs after normalizing their sizes by pretax income. Panel C shows the relative frequency of CAEs 








CAE Materiality Across All Three Quantitative Thresholds 
 
Frequency of CAEs below each quantitative threshold 













Pretax Income + 
Assets + Net Sales 
n % N % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
218 5.0 264 6.1 119 2.8 240 5.5 60 1.4 424 9.8 2,026 46.7 984 22.7 4,335 100.0 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the CAE size analysis across all three quantitative materiality thresholds for our sample of 4,335 CAEs. The table reflects the 
number (n) and percentage (%) of CAEs out of the full sample that fall BELOW the thresholds of 5% of pretax income (Pretax Income), 0.5% of total assets 












Prior_Restatement -0.199  0.277 ** 0.237 ** 
 (0.191)  (0.043)  (0.035)  
Critical -2.109 *** -2.103 *** -2.271 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Size 0.128 *** 0.311 *** 0.455 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Income_Effect 0.221 *** 0.224 *** 0.159 * 
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.052)  
10-K -0.462 *** -0.504 *** -0.583 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Big4 0.285 ** 0.317 * -0.144  
 (0.046)  (0.054)  (0.349)  
Repeat 0.034  0.152  0.044  
 (0.712)  (0.141)  (0.652)  
Litigation_Risk 0.045  0.148  -0.075  
 (0.734)  (0.250)  (0.640)  
Leverage -0.279 * -0.743 *** -0.006  
 (0.100)  (0.009)  (0.978)  
MTB 0.005  -0.024 ** -0.031 ** 
 (0.710)  (0.014)  (0.016)  
Z-score 0.002  0.009  0.044 ** 
 (0.850)  (0.671)  (0.014)  
CAE Account Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included 
Sample size 3,675 3,675 3,675 
 
Table 8 presents the regression results of a multivariate logistic regression model of the following form: 
 
        logit(Pr[BMT=1]) = β0 + β1 Prior_Restatement + β2 Critical +β3 Size + β4 Income_Effect + β5 10-K + 
  β6 Big4 + β7 Repeat + β8 Litigation_Risk + β9 Leverage + β10 MTB + β11 Z-score + 
                                    Account_Fixed_Effects + Industry_Fixed_Effects + Year_Fixed_Effects + ε         (1)                                            
 
where BMT has a value of 1 if a disclosed CAE is below the traditional materiality thresholds of 5% of pretax income, 
0.5% of total assets, or 0.5% of net sales, and 0 if a disclosed CAE is above that threshold. Restatement is an indicator 
taking on a value of 1 if a firm filed a restatement within the same or previous four quarters as a CAE was filed and 0 
otherwise. Critical is an indicator taking on a value of 1 if the size of the disclosed CAE would have been sufficient 
to either push its pre-CAE net income above or below zero, and a value of 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of net 
sales at the beginning of the year in which a CAE is disclosed. Income_Effect equals 1 if a CAE increases income, and 
0 otherwise. 10-K equals 1 if a CAE is disclosed via a 10-K, and 0 otherwise. Big4 equals 1 if a CAE is disclosed by 
a client of a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise. Repeat equals 1 if a CAE is disclosed by a company disclosing more than 
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one CAE during the sample period. Litigation_Risk equals 1 if a CAE is disclosed by a company with a SIC code of 
2833–2836, 8731–8734, 3570–3577, 7370–7374, 3600–3674, or 5200–5961 (Francis, Philbrick and Schipper 1994). 
Leverage is defined as total debts divided by total assets reported in the last 10-K before a CAE. MTB is defined as 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity reported in the last 10-K before a CAE. Z-score is 
measured using Altman’s Z-score applied to the last 10-K before a CAE. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the two-digit SIC industry level are 
reported in parentheses. 
